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The conventional wisdom among scholars and policymakers holds that
international regulatory coordination is more likely to arise when regulatory
authority at the domestic level is consolidated within a single body rather than
dispersed across an array of agencies. Many prominent participants in the
ongoing debate over U.S. regulatory reform-including former Treasury
Secretary Hank Paulson and former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul
Volcker-have cited this supposed connection between domestic regulatory
consolidation and cross-border coordination as a reason to reduce the number
of U.S. agencies that share supervisory authority over the financial sector.
Scholars, however, have not rigorously tested this hypothesis.
This Note is a first step toward filling this gap. It examines how changes
in U.S. domestic regulatory structures across the commercial banking,
securities, and insurance sectors have shaped cross-border coordination over
the last twenty-five years. These case studies suggest a surprising conclusion:
contrary to the conventional wisdom, regulatory consolidation at the domestic
level appears to be negatively correlated with cross-border coordination. When
regulatory authority is fragmented among several agencies at the domestic
level, U.S. financial regulators turn to their cross-border counterparts in order
to circumvent roadblocks erected by domestic rivals. By contrast, in areas
where a single regulatory agency enjoys consolidated control over a particular
policy matter at the domestic level, that agency is less willing to restrict its
policymaking discretion through an international agreement.
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Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2007-2010 has galvanized movement toward
greater regulatory consolidation at the domestic level and greater regulatory
coordination at the international level. In March 2008-shortly after the Bear
Stearns collapse, though still several months before the failure of Lehman
Brothers-then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson unveiled a "blueprint" to
merge the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") with the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission ("CTFC") and to consolidate the Office of Thrift
Supervision ("OTS"), which oversees federally chartered savings and loan
associations, into the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"),
which oversees federally chartered banks.' Although the Obama
Administration ultimately dropped Paulson's proposal for an SEC-CFTC
merger, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
which President Obama signed in July 2010, folded the OTS into the OCC2 and
1. Press Release, Henry M. Paulson, Jr., U.S. Sec'y of the Treasury, Remarks on Blueprint for
Regulatory Reform (Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp897.htm.
2. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 312(b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1522 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5412) (transferring
supervisory authority over federal savings associations from the OTS to the OCC); see also Jon Prior,
OCC, OTS Merger Going 'Rockier' than Expected, HOUSINGWIRE (Nov. 8, 2010, 4:31 PM),
http://www.housingwire.com/2010/l l/08/occ-ots-merger-may-be-going-rockier-than-expected (noting
that 600 to 700 employees will transfer from the OTS to the OCC by July 2011). Of the 734 institutions
currently supervised by the OTS, 673 are federal savings associations and 61 are state savings




further centralized supervisory responsibilities in a new Financial Stability
Oversight Council chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. At the same time,
as the Obama Administration and its allies in Congress have taken steps to
reduce the fragmentation of regulatory authority at the domestic level, the
Administration and its international counterparts are seeking to promote closer
coordination among financial regulators across borders.4 In a 2009 "white
paper," the Obama Administration's Treasury Department called for the
"continued operational development of supervisory colleges" that would bring
together regulators from various countries who oversee the thirty largest global
financial institutions. Meanwhile, regulators from the United States and other
industrialized nations have agreed on new global banking rules (the so-called
6"Basel III") that are scheduled to take effect beginning in 2013. Throughout
the regulatory reform process, the Obama Administration has emphasized that
its twin goals of domestic regulatory consolidation and cross-border regulatory
coordination are "consistent" with one another.7
Scholars specializing in financial regulation have echoed the Obama
Administration's assumption that domestic regulatory consolidation and
international regulatory coordination are complementary-perhaps even
mutually dependent. David Andrew Singer has written that the "fragmentation
of accountability among U.S. regulators" is a "serious barrier to future efforts at
international regulatory harmonization." According to Singer, the "possible
consolidation of U.S. regulatory agencies" is the only "glimmer of hope" for
greater global cooperation. Lawrence Cunningham and David Zaring echo this
sentiment, writing that the "fragmentation of authority" among banking
regulators at the domestic level has "complicated . . . efforts to create common
http://www.ots.treas.gov/?p=InstitutionSearch (last visited Dec. 4, 2010). Under the Dodd-Frank Act,
the FDIC will assume authority over the 61 state associations. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act § 312(b)(2)(C).
3. Id. § 111.
4. See Letter Co-Signed by Nicholas Sarkozy, President of the Republic of Fr., Barack Obama,
President of the U.S., et al., to the G20 Heads of State and Gov't (Mar. 30, 2010), available at
https://pastel.diplomatie.gouv.fr/editorial/actual/ael2/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20100331 .gb.html&submit.x
=12&submit.y-5&submit=consulter#Chapitre2.
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 81 (2009), available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf
6. New Bank Rules To Curb Risk, CNNMONEY.COM (Sept. 12, 2010, 4:04 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/12/news/economy/Baselglobal bankingregulations.
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 5, at 80.
8. David Andrew Singer, The Subprime Accountability Deficit and the Obstacles to
International Standards Setting, 15 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 23, 26-27 (2010) [hereinafter Singer,
Subprime Accountability Deficit]; see also David Andrew Singer, Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics
of International Regulatory Harmonization, 58 INT'L ORG. 531 (2004) [hereinafter Singer, Capital
Rules]; David Andrew Singer, Uncertain Leadership: The U.S. Regulatory Response to the Global
Financial Crisis, in GLOBAL FINANCE IN CRISIS: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
CHANGE 93 (Eric Helleiner, Stefano Pagliari & Hubert Zimmermann eds., 2009) [hereinafter Singer,
Uncertain Leadership].
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international supervisory standards."9 John Coffee has written that "[p]erhaps[]
the best argument for consolidation" is that "it may be easier for a consolidated
agency to . . . negotiate for 'harmonized' international standards than for a
bifurcated structure to do so."'0 Numerous other scholars have repeated the
conventional wisdom that domestic regulatory fragmentation impedes cross-
border coordination.
Outside of the academy, the view that domestic regulatory fragmentation
has hindered international cooperation increasingly influences debates about
the structure of financial supervision. A 2004 World Bank publication stated
that one advantage of regulatory consolidation is that it "facilitates international
cooperation."' 2 The Group of Thirty, a consultative body led by former Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, recommended in January 2009 that countries
"substantially simplify and consolidate" their regulatory structures and
suggested that this step was "important[] for much greater levels of
international cooperation and coordination."' 3 In May 2009, the Committee on
Capital Markets Regulation, a bipartisan panel whose members include
business leaders and former government officials, reported that "the fragmented
U.S. system of prudential supervision . . . impairs our ability to coordinate
supervision internationally." 4 The panel concluded that the OCC, the OTS, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the SEC, and the CFTC
should "all be merged and consolidated."' 5 Then-Secretary Paulson expressed a
similar view in March 2008 when, in his blueprint for domestic regulatory
consolidation, he stated that the merger of supervisory agencies would
"enhance ... international regulatory dialogue." 6
9. Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial
Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39,
101 (2009).
10. John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of Organizational
Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 Bus. LAW. 447, 482 (1995).
11. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum-Out of Many, One: Why the United
States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 1, 49 (2005) ("[T]he
fractured nature of the U.S. financial regulatory regime has negatively affected efforts by U.S. regulators
to participate effectively in international forums."); John R. Dearie & George J. Vojta, Reform and
Modernization of Financial Supervision in the United States: A Competitive and Prudential Imperative 3
(May 9, 2007), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/glbaplus.pdf ("[T]he complexity and
inconsistencies of the U.S. framework of financial supervision . . . represent a major obstacle to greater
international cooperation among financial supervisors.").
12. See Jeffrey Carmichael, Summary of the Discussion, in ALIGNING FINANCIAL
SUPERVISORY STRUCTURES WITH COUNTRY NEEDS 1, 3 (Jeffrey Carmichael, Alexander Fleming &
David Llewellyn eds., World Bank Inst., 2004).
13. THE GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY
35 (2009), available at http://www.group30.org/pubs/reformreport.pdf.
14. COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A
PLAN FOR REGULATORY REFORM 206 (2009), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFC-
CCMR Report_(5-26-09).pdf.
15. Id. at 203.





The assumption that regulatory consolidation will facilitate cross-border
coordination may seem so intuitive that scholars have failed to test it against
the historical record. Instead, we have incorporated this conventional wisdom
into our policy debates without ever seriously questioning it. But as this Note
argues, this assumption does not stand up to scrutiny. Through case studies of
banking, securities, and insurance regulation, this Note will show that U.S.
financial regulators are most likely to coordinate with their cross-border
counterparts when domestic regulatory authority is fractured and when agency
autonomy is under attack. Domestic regulatory consolidation does not
"facilitate[] international cooperation"; to the contrary, it makes international
cooperation much less probable.
This argument yields important implications for the study of international
law and financial regulation. Scholars seeking to explain the shape of existing
international institutions have already realized that a country's domestic
regulatory structure may affect its propensity and capacity to engage in cross-
border coordination. But so far, international law scholars have assumed that
the correlation between domestic consolidation and international cooperation is
positive. For example, Pierre-Hugues Verdier wrote recently that "the more
domestic autonomy [regulators] have, the more likely they are to enhance
,,1 8international enforcement and harmonization of standards .... Christopher
Whytock reiterates the same supposition: "The more autonomy a legal or
regulatory agency possesses in a given issue area or a given state, the more
likely the agency is to engage in transgovernmental cooperation on the issue
with foreign counterparts."' 9 Verdier and Whytock have correctly identified
domestic regulatory consolidation as an important independent variable
affecting the probability of cross-border coordination; however, as this Note
will demonstrate, the effect is the exact opposite of the effect that Verdier and
Whytock predict.
This Note's argument also informs ongoing policy debates regarding
regulatory consolidation. Domestic regulatory consolidation may be desirable
for reasons unrelated to its international effects, but the often-repeated
17. See supra text accompanying note 12.
18. Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J.
INT'L L. 113, 170 (2009).
19. Christopher A. Whytock, A Rational Design Theory of Transgovernmentalism: The Case
ofE.U.-U.S. Merger Review Cooperation, 23 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 31 (2005).
20. A vibrant debate about regulatory consolidation occurred in the United Kingdom in the
run-up to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which vested the Financial Services Authority
with the power to serve as the single regulator for banks, securities firms, and insurers. See Howard
Davies, Reforming Financial Regulation, in REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS IN THE
21sT CENTURY 17, 19 (Eilis Ferran & Charles A.E. Goodhart eds., 2001) (noting that the Financial
Services and Markets Act was the subject of some 200 hours of parliamentary debate). Arguments in
favor of the single-regulator model-which ultimately carried the day in the United Kingdom-are
summarized in Clive Briault, The Rationale for a Single National Financial Services Regulator (Fin.
Serv. Auth., Occasional Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2, 1999), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=428086. According to Briault, regulatory consolidation generates "economies
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argument that regulatory consolidation will facilitate further international
cooperation is misguided. As policymakers determine the future of the financial
regulatory structure, they must carefully weigh the costs and benefits of
consolidation. Unless they correctly assess the relationship between agency
consolidation and cross-border coordination, they run the risk of making major
decisions about regulatory structure based on faulty conventional wisdom.
Part I of this Note presents three hypotheses regarding the relationship
between consolidation and coordination. The null hypothesis holds that
domestic regulatory consolidation has no effect on the probability of cross-
border coordination. The majority view holds that domestic regulatory
consolidation has a positive effect on the probability of cross-border
coordination. The alternative hypothesis holds that domestic regulatory
consolidation has a negative effect on the probability of cross-border
coordination. Part I also explains the case study methodology that this Note
will use to evaluate these three competing hypotheses empirically.
Part II tests these hypotheses through a case study of banking regulation.
It begins with the Basel I negotiations in the 1980s and finds that the Federal
Reserve used the Basel process to bypass domestic opposition from other
regulatory agencies. It proceeds to show that when the Fed enjoys relative
autonomy in a given issue area (for example, liquidity requirements and
holding company rules), it has adopted a go-it-alone strategy; by contrast, when
the Fed shares authority in an issue area with the OCC and the FDIC, it tends to
favor an internationalist approach.
Part III extends the analysis to securities regulation. It finds that the SEC
stymied efforts to apply Basel-style rules to the securities industry in the early
1990s, in part because the Commission did not want to cede its domestic
autonomy. Only after the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 offered
opportunities for the Fed and the OTS to encroach upon the SEC's regulatory
autonomy did the SEC embrace efforts to establish global capital requirements
for investment banks.
Part IV considers the Treasury Department's recent efforts to jumpstart
international negotiations on insurance capital requirements. This Part explores
the relationship between regulatory fragmentation at the domestic level and the
of scale and scope," id. at 18; produces "a... more efficient... allocation of regulatory resources
across both regulated firms and types of regulated activities," id. at 20; creates a check against
regulatory arbitrage, id. at 22; and establishes clear lines of accountability, id. at 22-23. On the other
hand, regulatory fragmentation may lead to "beneficial competition" among agencies and may allow
agencies to specialize in specific subject areas. See Richard J. Rosen, Switching Primary Federal
Regulators: Is It Beneficial for U.S. Banks?, FED. RES. BANK OF CHI. ECON. PERSP., 3d Q. 2005, at 16,
31; see also id. at 31 ("My results imply that banks switching regulators ... increased return [on assets]
without a rise in bank failures."). A full analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of regulatory
consolidation lies beyond the scope of this Note. Rather, this Note advances the limited-though
significant-claim that the correlation between domestic consolidation and cross-border coordination




Treasury Department's decision to pursue its policy objectives through
multilateral channels.
Finally, Part V concludes by evaluating the empirical results of the case
studies and analyzing the implications for scholars and policymakers.
Ultimately, it is impossible to understand pattems of global financial
governance unless one understands the way regulators respond to domestic
fragmentation. This Note argues for a reexamination of the interplay between
domestic regulatory agencies and intemational coordination.
I. Three Theories of Cross-Border Coordination Among Financial
Regulators
This Part presents three potential hypotheses regarding the relationship
between domestic regulatory consolidation and cross-border coordination.
Section L.A considers the null hypothesis, that is, that factors exogenous to
domestic regulatory structure drive international cooperation. Section I.B
explores the "majority view," which holds that the correlation between
domestic consolidation and cross-border coordination is positive. Section I.C
presents the alternative hypothesis that domestic consolidation is negatively
correlated with cross-border coordination. This Part explains the intuitions
underlying each of these perspectives. The remainder of this Note will test
these three hypotheses against the historical record.
A. The Null Hypothesis: No Correlation Between Domestic Consolidation
and Cross-Border Coordination
Several scholars have argued that factors exogenous to the domestic
regulatory structure determine whether-and how-U.S. agencies seek to
coordinate with their cross-border counterparts. According to Beth Simmons's
influential account of regulatory coordination, U.S. agencies will pursue
policies through multilateral fora when the divergence between domestic and
foreign regulatory regimes generates negative externalities for U.S. markets
and firms.21 Simmons sees regulation as a two-stage process. At the first stage,
the United States adopts a particular policy for its capital markets, and other
countries react to the U.S. policy (or the United States "anticipat[es] . . . the
reactions of the rest of the world"22 when those reactions are relatively
predictable). At the second stage, the United States determines whether other
countries' reactions have resulted in negative externalities for U.S. firms and
U.S. markets. If they have, the United States uses coordination to mitigate these
externalities as much as possible. Although Simmons would acknowledge that
21. See Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital
Market Regulation, 55 INT'L ORG. 589, 596-600 (2001).
22. Id. at 596.
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23domestic regulatory structure may have an effect on outcomes at stage one,
her theory holds that domestic regulatory structure has a null effect at stage two
on the decision whether to coordinate with cross-border counterparts.24 From
this Note's perspective, Simmons's externalities argument serves as the null
hypothesis because it holds that there is no correlation-positive or negative-
between domestic regulatory consolidation and cross-border coordination
(except inasmuch as domestic regulatory structure yields "stage one" effects).
What sorts of spillover effects from regulatory divergence might prompt
the United States to pursue an international agreement? First, if other countries
set bank capital requirements below the United States's, then foreign financial
institutions may take on greater leverage, which increases their risk of failure.
The contagion effects of a foreign firm's failure may be felt by the firm's U.S.
counterparties (as in the 1974 liquidation of Germany's Herstatt Bank and in
the 1982 collapse of Italy's Banco Ambrosiano illustrated).25 Second, lower
capital requirements abroad may put foreign firms at a competitive advantage
vis-i-vis their U.S. counterparts. For example, in the 1980s, American and
European financiers argued that "Japan's requirement for relatively low levels
of capital . . . permitted its banks to offer extremely low pricing and thus
capture market share."26 From Simmons's perspective, the case of capital
adequacy regulation supports the externalities argument: the United States did
suffer from negative externalities, and the United States did respond by
promoting the Basel I Accord for commercial banks.2 7
If Simmons's theory is correct, then we would expect to see more
multilateral regulation in industries that generate significant transnational
spillover effects, and less cross-border coordination in sectors that produce
smaller spillover effects. More specifically, we would expect higher levels of
regulatory coordination in (1) sectors in which the failure of a single firm poses
systemic risks and (2) sectors in which cross-border competition for market
share is fierce.
Consistent with the first expectation, regulatory coordination has
historically been much more extensive in commercial banking than in the
securities and insurance industries, and the scholarly consensus (at least prior to
23. Id. at 595-96. Similarly, Daniel Drezner proposes a "two-stage" or "two-step" framework
for analyzing regulatory cooperation. "The first step is identifying the domestic actors and institutions
that explain the origin of state preferences. The second step is to take those preferences as given for
international interactions, and to explain the bargaining outcomes as a function of the distribution of
interests and capabilities [among states]." DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES 6 (2007). Like Simmons, Drezner assumes a world in which
the impact of domestic regulatory structure is confined to the "first step." According to this view, any
effect of domestic regulatory structure on the probability of international cooperation is indirect.
24. See Simmons, supra note 21, at 596.
25. See Ethan B. Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma: International Coordination of
Banking Regulation, 43 INT'L ORG. 323, 325 (1989).
26. See id. at 327.




the Lehman Brothers collapse and the near-failure of the insurer AIG in
September 2008) held that the systemic risks inherent in commercial banking
exceed those of the latter two sectors. Before proceeding further, it is important
to distinguish between solvency risk (that is, the risk that a firm will not have
sufficient assets to cover its liabilities) and liquidity risk (that is, the risk that a
firm will not have sufficient liquid assets to pay its debts as they come due). It
is not necessarily the case that commercial banks face higher solvency risks
than their securities and insurance industry counterparts. A 2000 study by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York calculated the Z-score-"the number of
standard deviations below the mean by which profits must fall to bankrupt the
firm"-for banks, securities firms, and insurers, and found that throughout the
1971-1998 period, commercial banks exhibited lower solvency risks than
institutions in the other sectors.28 However, commercial banks do face unique
risks to liquidity because they rely on demand deposits that can be redeemed on
29a "first-come, first-served" basis. By contrast, securities firms and insurance
companies "are not reliant on first-come, first-served demand liabilities, and so
they are not vulnerable . . . to subsequent pressures to liquidate assets rapidly in
order to meet the demands of creditors." 30 The apparent fact that commercial
banks are more vulnerable to "runs" than are securities firms and insurers might
28. Cara S. Lown et al., The Changing Landscape of the Financial Services Industry: What
Lies Ahead?, 6 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REv. 39, 45, 46 tbl.6 (2000).
29. Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in Banks,
Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL: BANKING,
SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE 15, 19 (Hal S. Scott ed., 2005).
30. Id. at 21, 24. Herring and Schuermann conclude that securities firms generate less systemic
risk than banks because (1) securities firms keep customer funds in segregated accounts, so "bad news
about the firms' own assets need not cause concern about the assets of the firms' clients"; (2) "liabilities
of the securities firms are not . . . payable on a first-come, first-served basis"; (3) "securities firms
generally hold liquid, tradeable assets" that allow firms to "reduce the size of [their] balance sheet
relatively easily, without incurring fire-sale losses"; and (4) "securities firms do not have direct access to
large-value payment systems." Id. at 21. "[T]he most important test of these hypotheses to date is the
collapse of the [securities firm] Drexel Burnham Lambert" in 1990, which caused "minimal disruption
of services" and no "systemic disturbances." Id. at 22; see also Martin F. Grace, The Insurance Industry
and Systemic Risk: Evidence and Discussion 10-11 (Ind. State Univ., Network Fin. Inst., Policy Brief
No. 2010-PB-02, 2010) ("Banks have deposits which are short term in nature, but they make long-term
loans. This causes a maturity mismatch .... Insurers, in contrast, are structured differently, as their
inputs and outputs are more closely matched in duration ... [and] they do not have as severe a liquidity
problem .... ); Scott E. Harrington, The Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, and the Future of Insurance
Regulation, ISSUE ANALYSIS (Nat'1 Ass'n of Mut. Ins. Cos., Indianapolis, Ind.), Sept. 2009, at 3
(concluding that "[s]ystemic risk is low in insurance markets compared with banking"). But see Peter
Boone & Simon Johnson, Waiting for the Next Lehman, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Sept. 13, 2009, at 8,
available at
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tollbusiness/industrysectors/banking and finance/article6832440.ece
(noting that the securities firm Lehman Brothers held illiquid investments such as a ski resort and
suburban housing developments, and "[w]orries about these investments sparked a run on the bank");
Mary Williams Walsh, Audit Faults New York Fed in A.. G. Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2009, at BI
(describing the downfall of insurer AIG as a "run-on-the-bank disaster"). See generally George G.
Kaufman, Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence, 8 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 123, 125
(1994) ("[U]nlike banks, nonbanks ... have relatively little demand or very short-term debt that can run
in response to [an] adverse shock.").
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explain why cross-border coordination in the commercial banking sector has
outpaced regulatory cooperation in other areas of financial services.
It seems strange, however, that cross-border regulatory coordination in the
commercial banking sector has focused on risks to solvency, not risks to
liquidity. Indeed, the Basel Accords "lack ... specified liquidity requirements"
altogether. 3 1 The Basel Accords only address the asset and equity components
of a bank's balance sheet, not whether liquid assets will be available to meet
liabilities as they come due. If banks pose unique systemic risks (relative to
securities firms and insurers) because of the composition of their liabilities,
then one might question whether the Accords actually address the negative
externalities that arise from commercial banking.
Moreover, it is not clear that cross-border competition is greater in the
commercial banking sector than in other industries. Commercial banking may
entail higher entry barriers and switching costs than other forms of financial
services, in part because banking--even in the era of the Internet-still
revolves around physical branch locations. 32 To the extent that a customer's
geographic proximity to his or her commercial bank affects the quality of
services, we would expect bank customers to be less price elastic than
consumers of other financial services.33 Indeed, U.S. commercial banks have
protected their market share more effectively than many other U.S. financial
services providers. For example, whereas foreign-owned banks now account
for approximately 13% of all U.S. commercial banking sector assets, foreign
reinsurers control more than 80% of the U.S. unaffiliated reinsurance premium
market. 34
31. Barry Eichengreen, Ten Questions About the Subprime Crisis, 11 BANQUE DE FR. FIN.
STABILITY REV. 19, 22-23 (2008); see also Charles Goodhart, Liquidity Risk Management, 11 BANQUE
DE FR. FIN. STABILITY REV. 39, 40 (2008) ("[I]n the 1980s, at the same time as the Basel Committee
was wrestling with capital adequacy issues, it was also attempting to Teach agreement on liquidity risk
management. For reasons that I have yet to discover, it failed.").
32. See, e.g., Andrew M. Cohen & Michael J. Mazzeo, Market Structure and Competition
Among Retail Depository Institutions, 89 REV. ECON. & STAT. 60, 61 (2007) ("While banking
organizations have grown in size and geographic scope, there is strong evidence that retail banking
markets are local in nature ... . [C]onsumers and small businesses tend to obtain their bank services
from nearby providers.").
33. On entry barriers and switching costs in commercial banking, see Doris Neuberger,
Industrial Organization of Banking: A Review, 5 INT'L J. EcoN. OF Bus. 97 (1998). See also Claudia M.
Buch, Financial Market Integration in the U.S.: Lessons for Europe 21-22 (Kiel Inst. of World Econ.,
Working Paper No. 1004, 2000) ("[M]arket power derived from intimate knowledge of smaller
customers, of local market conditions, and from existing customer conducts has partially shielded banks
from competitive pressure.").
34. Compare Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United States 3, 19, BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/20101126 (last
updated Nov. 26 2010) (showing that foreign-related institutions hold $1.062 trillion in U.S. deposits, or
13% of the $7.921 trillion of total U.S. commercial bank deposits), with Issue Update: Reinsurance, INS.
INFO. INST., http://old.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/reinsurance (last updated June 2009) (stating
that offshore reinsurers, along with U.S. subsidiaries of offshore reinsurers, controlled 83.4% of the U.S.
unaffiliated reinsurance premium market in 2007). The unaffiliated reinsurance premium market




In sum, concerns about systemic risk and competitiveness provide, at best,
an incomplete explanation for the variation in international regulatory
coordination across issue areas. Even if the banking sector's reliance on short-
term deposits does lead to unique systemic risks, this does not explain why U.S.
regulators have coordinated with their cross-border counterparts on bank
solvency requirements but not bank liquidity requirements. Moreover,
competitiveness concerns in commercial banking do not seem to be any more
severe-and are perhaps less severe-than in other financial services sectors.
These conclusions suggest that we cannot rely only on externalities as
explanatory variables if we are to construct a coherent theory of cross-border
regulatory coordination.
B. The Majority View: Positive Correlation Between Domestic Consolidation
and Cross-Border Coordination
The majority view holds that the degree of domestic regulatory
consolidation is positively correlated with the probability of cross-border
coordination. There are two general justifications for this view. The first
focuses on the capacity of regulators to reach out to their cross-border
counterparts. As Coffee writes, "it may be easier for a consolidated agency
to ... negotiate for 'harmonized' international standards than for a bifurcated
structure to do so." 35 The second focuses on the willingness of regulators to
engage in cross-border coordination. According to Singer, regulatory
fragmentation allows agencies to play a domestic "blame game" instead of
addressing systemic risks through multilateral institutions.
There are several reasons why regulatory consolidation might affect the
capacity of agencies to engage in cross-border coordination. Smaller agencies
may lack the resources to conduct negotiations or joint supervisory operations
with their overseas counterparts. For example, the CFTC warned Congress in
2007 that funding cuts "could require the Commission to reduce its
participation in standard-setting international organizations, restrict its ability to
engage in bilateral meetings with foreign regulatory authorities . . . , and restrict
[its] ability to . .. participate in international dialogues. Meanwhile, the OTS
was the agency officially tasked with the responsibility of coordinating with
EU regulators regarding AIG, but the OTS had no office in the United
35. Coffee, supra note 10, at 482.
36. See Singer, Uncertain Leadership, supra note 8, at 101.
37. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, FY 2008 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET AND
PERFORMANCE PLAN 78 (2007), available at
http://www.cfic.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/2008budgetperf.pdf; see also
Jeremy Grant, Concern Grows over Budget for CFTC Regulation, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2b51ablc-cfdc- 1ldb-94cb-000b5dfl0621.htm1.
38. Jeff Gerth, Was AIG Watchdog Not Up to the Job?, PROPUBLICA, Nov. 10, 2008,
http://www.propublica.org/feature/was-aig-watchdog-not-up-to-the-job.
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Kingdom (or anywhere else in Europe)39 from which to oversee the AIG
London unit that reportedly "managed $2 trillion in derivative trades."4 0
According to the majority view, regulatory fragmentation leads to
circumstances in which a small agency may be "out of its league"4A in trying to
supervise a complex conglomerate and coordinate with foreign officials.
Consolidation would allow agencies to capitalize on economies of scale,
streamlining cross-border coordination efforts through international affairs
specialists. Additionally, when more U.S. agencies have authority over a given
issue area, it may be more difficult to coordinate with cross-border counterparts
because the U.S. regulators have trouble coordinating even among
42themselves. Advocates of consolidation say that a streamlined regulatory
structure will allow the United States to speak with one voice on international
regulatory issues.43
One leading exponent of this "majority view," Singer, has argued that
regulators with consolidated authority at the domestic level not only find that
they have greater capacity to engage in cross-border coordination, but also that
they have a stronger self-interest in doing so. According to Singer, "[p]olitical
pressure from Congress must . . . be direct and unambiguous in order to spur
regulators to press forward on the international front."44 Moreover, legislators
will only hold regulators accountable when either (1) "[r]egulations that are too
lax ... contribute to faltering firms and a crisis of confidence among voters," or
(2) "regulations that are too strict . . . put domestic firms at a competitive
disadvantage."4 5 Under these conditions, legislators may remove regulatory
responsibilities from an agency or, as a more drastic measure, abolish the
39. See OTS Contacts, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION,
http://www.ots.treas.gov/?p=ContactOTS (last visited May 27, 2010). Other agencies have more
extensive overseas operations. The OCC, for example, has a London office, see Large Bank Examiners
In-Charge, COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, http://www.occ.treas.gov/lbdist.htm (last visited May 27,
2010), and the SEC has a "long history of ... involvement with international markets" dating back to
the Commission's beginnings during the Great Depression, see Felice Batlan, The Imperial SEC?:
Foreign Policy and the Internationalization of the Securities Markets, 1934-1990, SEC HISTORICAL,
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/imp (last updated Dec. 1, 2008).
40. Karen Gullo, Former AIG Executive Cassano Said Not To Face Charges in Insurer's
Failure, BLOOMBERG, May 22, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=auksbwRhTw7w.
41. See Adriane Fresh & Martin Neil Baily, What Does International Experience Tell Us
About Regulatory Consolidation? 3 (Pew Econ. Policy Dep't, Fin. Reform Project, Briefing Paper No. 6,
2009), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edulfic/Policy/ 20page/Fresh-Baily-Intemational-Final-TF-
Correction.pdf.
42. See Singer, Subprime Accountability Deficit, supra note 8, at 27 ("Consider the immense
challenges of creating a global standard . . . when the agencies within the United States are at odds with
one another.").
43. See, e.g., Systemic Risk and Insurance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets,
Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 11 I th Cong. 18-20 (2009) (statement
of Franklin W. Nutter, President, Reinsurance Association of America).
44. See Singer, Subprime Accountability Deficit, supra note 8, at 25.




agency entirely.46 When regulators cannot "maintain a balance between
confidence and competitiveness" on their own, then they will "have incentives
to seek an international regulatory agreement to maintain their autonomy." 47
However, according to Singer, "regulatory accountability in the US is muddled
and fragmented," and as a result, agencies are not being held accountable in the
current crisis.48 Since regulators are not being held accountable, they face no
"direct and unambiguous" pressure to pursue international agreements.
There are at least two major problems with this "accountability"
argument. First, although Singer assumes that Congress will respond to
regulatory failures by removing responsibilities from an agency, the historical
record suggests that Congress's response might be exactly the opposite.
Although an investigation by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee after
the 2001 collapse of Enron revealed a "systemic and arguably catastrophic
failure" at the SEC,49 Congress responded by expanding the power of the SEC
through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.0 Similarly, despite the Federal
Reserve's regulatory failures in the run-up to the recent financial crisis, 51 the
financial reform legislation passed by the Senate in May 2010 grants broad new
powers to the Fed (including, potentially, the power to regulate any firm
"whose size, complexity, or interconnectedness makes [it] in need of extra
oversight").52 Although there are counterexamples in which Congress has
abolished an agency in response to a regulatory failure,53 the correlation
between crisis and autonomy is not clear-cut: regulators who fail to "maintain a
balance between confidence and competitiveness" 54 are just as likely to gain
new powers as to lose them. Second, it seems, at least intuitively, that Congress
46. Id. at 540-41. For example, after the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, which regulated
savings and loan associations, failed to avert an industry-wide crisis in the 1980s, Congress abolished
the Bank Board and replaced it with a new agency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, lodged in the
Treasury Department. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, §§ 309, 401, 103 Stat. 498 (codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
47. Singer, Capital Rules, supra note 8, at 561.
48. Singer, Uncertain Leadership, supra note 8, at 100.
49. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOv'T AFFAIRS, FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF
ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 2 (2002), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/100702watchdogsreport.pdf.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a
Response to Regulatory Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353, 1364-65 (2003) (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley
allowed the SEC to act without coordinating with cross-border counterparts and concluding that,
"ironically, crisis reduces rather than increases regulators' desire to participate in the globalization
process").
51. See William K. Black, Anti-Regulators: The Federal Reserve's War Against Effective
Regulation, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 11, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-k-black/anti-
regulators-the-feder b_418568.html.
52: Neil Irwin, For Fed, Overhaul To Bring Wider Reach, WASH. POST, May 25, 2010, at
A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/24/AR2010052404028.html?hpid=topnews.
53. The abolition of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, see supra note 46, and the
impending abolition of the OTS, see supra text accompanying note 2, are examples.
54. Singer, Capital Rules, supra note 8, at 561.
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is more likely to remove regulatory responsibilities from an agency when other
already-established agencies with overlapping mandates are available to fill the
void. For instance, it is probably easier to abolish the OTS when the
Comptroller of the Currency is already on hand to assume responsibilities for
the oversight of savings and loan associations than when OTS abolition would
require a replacement agency to be built from scratch. Thus, regulatory
fragmentation might increase the pressure on an agency to "maintain a balance
between confidence and competitiveness"55 because fragmentation decreases
the costs that Congress would have to bear in dismantling the agency. In sum,
although Singer assumes that regulatory consolidation will lead to greater
accountability, and greater accountability will lead to greater international
engagement, it may be that regulatory consolidation reduces the likelihood that
Congress will punish an agency by withdrawing some of the agency's
regulatory powers.
C. The Alternative Hypothesis: Negative Correlation Between Domestic
Consolidation and Cross-Border Coordination
This Note suggests an original, alternative hypothesis: regulatory
consolidation at the domestic level may decrease the probability of
coordination at the international level. Conceptually, there are four reasons why
we might expect this to be the case. First, a regulatory agency will incur higher
"autonomy costs,,56 as a result of cross-border coordination when domestic
regulatory authority is consolidated. If regulators are reluctant to relinquish
their policymaking discretion to international institutions, then, logically, they
will be more reluctant when they enjoy more discretion and less reluctant when
their autonomy is already constrained. Second, domestic fragmentation may
increase the "agenda control"57 benefits that regulators receive when they
coordinate with their cross-border counterparts. An international agreement
may narrow the menu of policy options at the domestic level, and a savvy
regulator may use this to her advantage in order to force an up-or-down
decision on her preferred policy. Third, regulators who pursue policy objectives
through multilateral channels may be able to leverage the "expert legitimacy"58
55. Id.
56. On "autonomy costs" as a disincentive to regulatory coordination, see Miles Kahler &
David A. Lake, Economic Integration and Global Governance: Why So Little Supranationalism, in THE
POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 242, 264 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009).
57. For a formal analysis of agenda control and its importance in political bodies, see Richard
D. McKelvey, Intransitivites in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda
Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472 (1976).
58. See, e.g., Neil Craik & Joseph DiMento, Environmental Cooperation in the (Partially)
Disaggregated State: Lessons from the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, 8 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 479, 483 (2008) (defining "expert legitimacy" as a form of legitimacy "whereby the authority





of international institutions. The regulator may have less difficulty convincing
domestic audiences to accept a particular policy once that policy has been
stamped with the imprimatur of a well-respected international organization. But
if regulatory authority is already consolidated such that an agency can pursue
its preferred policy without obtaining the approval of domestic counterparts,
then the agency may not need to leverage the legitimacy of an international
institution in order to enact its regulatory agenda. Fourth, domestic
fragmentation may create competitive pressures to coordinate with cross-border
counterparts. Agencies may compete against their domestic rivals in a "race to
coordinate": each regulator in the fragmented system might rush to be the first
to link up with partners abroad.
1. Autonomy Costs
Theories of regulation are often categorized as either "public interest"
theories or "public choice" theories. 59 The public interest perspective assumes
that bureaucrats are "benevolent . . . , trustworthy, disinterested, and public-
spirited experts who produce rules that ensure general economic efficiency and
maximum welfare for society."60 Public choice theory assumes that regulators
are "rationally self-interested" individuals who seek to capture rents for either
themselves or their benefactors.6'
Scholars from both camps agree on the importance of "autonomy" as an
interim objective for regulators. As Daniel Carpenter writes, autonomy is a
"proximate goal" for regulators because "whatever else they desire," autonomy
is "necessary to achieve it."62 Enrico Colombatto and Jonathan Macey, who
describe themselves as followers of the "public choice" school of thought,
argue that self-interested regulators covet autonomy because they seek "to
maximize the rough value of their bureaucracies." 6 3 Other scholars see a link
59. See, e.g., Michael Hantke-Domas, The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-
Existence or Misinterpretation, 15 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 165 (2003). Hantke-Domas suggests that "public
interest" theory is little more than a straw man: "Public Interest Theory does not have any known
origin," and writers who refer to it have not "mentioned any author or supporter of it." Id. at 166. But see
Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda:
Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 168 (1990) ("A tradition starting at least with Plato,
which has survived to this day, describes government policy-makers as 'public individuals,' struggling
to find the policy choice that is best for some polity in whose interests they govern.").
60. Cf Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in
Global Politics, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION, supra note 56, at 1, 9 (critically evaluating
public interest and public choice theories).
61. See, e.g., Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of
International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 929
(1996).
62. DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS,
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 374-75 n.16 (200 1).
63. Colombatto & Macey, supra note 61, at 933 (citation omitted); see also JAMES Q. WILSON,
BUREAUCRATS: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND WHY THEY Do IT 195 (1989) ("Autonomy is
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between regulatory autonomy and the pursuit of the public interest.6 It may be
that Federal Reserve officials genuinely believe that bank regulation will
generate "general economic efficiency and maximum welfare" if it is
conducted by the Fed rather than the FDIC or the Comptroller of the
Currency.65 It may also be that SEC officials sincerely view their agency as a
more competent securities regulator than the CFTC or other challengers to the
SEC's incumbency.66 While this Note takes no sides in the public
interest/public choice debate, it appears that regardless of whether regulators
behave in their own interests or in the interests of society at large, they value
autonomy as a means for achieving whatever end they adopt.
Thus, public interest and public choice theorists alike can agree with
Colombatto and Macey when they write that "[a]ll else equal, regulators would
prefer not to cede or to -share authority with their counterparts from other
countries." When regulators reach agreements with their cross-border
counterparts, they incur "autonomy costs"68 because they bind themselves to
pursue certain policies and promise not to pursue others. Moreover, the
autonomy costs of cross-border regulation will be higher when a regulator's
baseline level of policymaking autonomy is higher. Cross-border coordination
will be less attractive to a regulator in a consolidated system who enjoys wide
policymaking discretion at the domestic level. In contrast, a regulator whose
discretion is already quite constrained will see that she has less to lose if she
binds herself to an international accord.
2. Agenda Control
Not only may cross-border coordination lead to lower costs for a regulator
in a fragmented environment, but it may also bring greater benefits.
Specifically, international agreements may serve as tools for agenda control.
Imagine three regulators (1, 2, and 3) choose among three policy options (A, B,
and C). Regulator I prefers A to B and B to C. Regulator 2's preference order
is B, then C, then A. Regulator 3's preference order is C, then A, then B. All
regulators prefer A, B, and C to the status quo, but no single policy option
valued [by agencies] at least as much as resources, because autonomy determines the degree to which it
is costly to acquire and use resources.").
64. See Frances E. Rourke, Bureaucratic Autonomy and the Public Interest, 22 AM. BEHAV.
Sci. 545 (1979) ("As far as self-directing agencies are concerned, it can be argued that the autonomy
they enjoy is often indispensable for the effective performance of a public function.").
65. See, e.g., Ernest T. Patrikis & John R. Dearie, Supervisory Power Is Critical to Fed's Rule,
POLiCo, Mar. 1, 2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/33659.html (arguing that the
"Fed .. . has unrivaled institutional experience as a supervisor").
66. See, e.g., David L. Ratner, The SEC at Sixty: A Reply to Professor Macey, 16 CARDOzO L.
REV. 1765, 1772 (1994) ("[O]utside observers rate the SEC as a far more effective regulator than the
CFTC in dealing with essentially similar problems . . . .").
67. Colombatto & Macey, supra note 61, at 926.
68. See Neil S. Siegel, International Delegations and the Values of Federalism, 71 LAW &




generates a consensus (or even a majority).69 The consequence is a voting
"cycle": "policy proposals can just go around and around with no end."70 The
cycle will end only if one actor delimits the menu of options.71
International institutions can enable domestic actors to assert control over
the policy agenda by forcing a choice between two options. For example,
regulator 2 and her cross-border counterparts may sign an agreement adopting
option B. This forces regulators 1 and 3 to choose between ratification or
rejection of the accord (B versus the status quo). By excluding options A and C
from the policy menu, regulator 2 can achieve her ideal outcome. Part II of this
Note shows how the Federal Reserve used a similar strategy to cut through
regulatory gridlock at several points in the late 1980s.
3. Importing Credibility
International organizations-especially those with long histories and large
professional staffs-acquire "expert legitimacy" on the basis of their technical
capabilities and reputations for competence. International organizations can
"wrap . . . a cloak of scientific respectability" around a regulator's policy
proposals. This "cloak of scientific respectability" may make the regulator's
arguments more compelling in the eyes of domestic audiences. When financial
governance is framed in technical rather than political terms, professional
economists employed by international organizations can lend legitimacy to
domestic regulators by bolstering the impression that rules reflect cutting-edge
expert knowledge.73 Thus, regulators may be willing to incur some autonomy
costs in order to acquire this "cloak." However, the cloak will be most
necessary to a regulator who cannot adopt domestic policies on its own-for
example, a regulator who needs to build a coalition of political actors in order
to achieve its policy preference. In other words, the cloak has greater value to a
regulator in a fragmented system whose policymaking discretion is constrained
by domestic rivals than to a regulator who already enjoys broad domestic
autonomy. Indeed, for the Federal Reserve, the cloak of legitimacy conferred
by an international organization did come in handy when the Fed was otherwise
constrained by domestic regulatory rivals. Just as the Federal Reserve used the
Basel Committee for agenda control purposes in the 1980s, the Fed also
leveraged the expert legitimacy of the Basel Committee in order to justify its
69. See Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difjiculty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON. 328,
328-30 (1950).
70. Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT'L L.
501, 527 (2004).
71. See KENNETH J. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
72. Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for
International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 620 (1999).
73. Id. (citation omitted).
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"value-at-risk" approach to capital regulation in the early 2000s. Section II.C
will explore this episode in further detail.
4. Competitive Coordination
Finally, a regulator may pursue cross-border coordination (at least in part)
to preempt another agency from doing the same. In this respect, cross-border
coordination may result from a sort of prisoner's dilemma among agencies-no
agency wants to bear the autonomy costs of multilateralism, but each regulator
would prefer to be bound by an agreement that it negotiated rather than an
agreement that one of its domestic rivals negotiated. The "race to coordinate"
may also serve to expedite the often-laborious process of negotiating an
international agreement. Part III of this Note shows how "first to coordinate"
pressures drove the SEC toward an agreement with the U.K. Financial Services
Authority ("FSA") in 2004 on capital requirements for securities firms.
Ultimately, the viability of the hypotheses presented in this Part depends
on whether they successfully predict real-world outcomes. The challenge is not
only to explain cross-border coordination when it occurs, but also to account
for the "dogs that didn't bark."7 4 Indeed, any effort to identify the determinants
of cross-border coordination that only focused on cases of cross-border
coordination would be "selecting on the dependent variable" and would thus be
of limited inferential value. 7 5 Accordingly, the following Parts will examine the
three traditional financial services sectors-banking, securities, and
insurance-even though cross-border coordination has not arisen in all three.
By considering cases in which the value of the dependent variable is positive
(when cross-border coordination does occur) and cases in which the value of
the dependent variable is negative (when it does not), this Note seeks to provide
a fuller account of the relationship between domestic regulatory consolidation
and international outcomes.
74. On the importance of "nonbarking dogs" in case study analysis, see generally James
Mahoney & Gary Goertz, The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative
Research, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 653, 653 (2004) ("A central challenge in qualitative research is
selecting the 'negative' cases (e.g., nonrevolutions, nonwars) to be included in analyses that seek to
explain positive outcomes of interest (e.g., revolutions, wars).... [lt is widely recognized that the
selection of negative cases is consequential for theory testing . . . .").
75. On the pitfalls of "selecting on the dependent variable" in comparative case study research,
see BARBARA GEDDES, PARADIGMS AND SAND CASTLES: THEORY BUILDING AND RESEARCH DESIGN IN
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 91 (2003) ("The adverse effects of selecting cases for study on the dependent
variable stem from the logic of inference. When one sets out to explain why countries A and B have,
say, developed more rapidly than countries C through I, one is implicitly looking for some antecedent
factors X through Z that countries A and B possess in greater degree than do countries C through 1. The
crux of the difficulty that arises when cases are selected on the dependent variable is that if one studies
only countries A and B, one can collect only part of the information needed, namely, the extent of
factors Xthrough Z in countries A and B. Unless one also studies countries C through I (or a sample of
them) to make sure they have less ofX through Z, one cannot know whether the factors identified really




II. Case Study: Capital Requirements, Liquidity Requirements, and Holding
Company Rules in the Banking Sector
A. The Basel I Accord
In July 1988, regulators from a dozen industrialized economies gathered
in Basel, Switzerland, to sign an agreement imposing common capital standards
on banks within their jurisdictions. The so-called Basel I Accord adopted a
"risk bucket" approach to capital requirements. As a general rule, banks would
have to hold $4 in equity or equity-like "Tier 1" capital for every $100 in "risk-
weighted" assets. But not all assets were weighted the same. For example,
OECD government debt would carry a 0% risk weight (and thus, banks would
not have to carry any capital to offset OECD debt on their balance sheets).
Residential mortgages would carry a 50% risk weight (and thus, banks would
have to carry $2 in Tier 1 capital for every $100 in home loans on their balance
sheets). Loans to corporations would carry a 100% risk weight (requiring $4 in
76Tier 1 capital for every $100 of corporate debt on a bank's balance sheet).
Twelve industrialized countries agreed to impose this common regulatory
scheme on their banks, with the requirements taking effect by 1992.
At the time, bank regulators expressed hopes that their colleagues in the
securities and insurance sectors would coordinate capital standards for firms in
their industries as well. Yet, more than one-and-a-half decades would elapse
before U.S. and EU regulators would establish a common system for regulating
capital at securities firms, and there is still no Basel-style accord for insurance.
What explains the coordination of capital standards in banking and the lack of
coordination in adjacent sectors?
Standard accounts of the Basel I Accord emphasize two motivations for
the 1988 agreement. First, regulators recognized that undercapitalized banks
generated systemic risks: the failure of a bank in one country could have
spillover effects on financial markets in another.7 9 Second, U.S. and U.K.
regulators sought to achieve a "level playing field"80 for their banks vis-A-vis
Japanese competitors. Before Basel, Japanese banks carried less capital than
76. See Bank for Int'l Settlements, Basle Comm. on Banking Supervision, International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (July 1988), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.htm.
77. The twelve signatories were Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany. See
generally Nathaniel C. Nash, Agreement on Banks' Capital Set, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1988, at DI
(summarizing the elements of the Accord).
78. James R. Kraus, Global Dispatches: More Eyes on Conglomerates Urged by Bank
Supervisors, AM. BANKER, Oct. 12, 1990, at 8.
79. See Kapstein, supra note 25; Simmons, supra note 21, at 601-02.
80. Kapstein, supra note 25, at 339. Kapstein notes, however, that Basel I, "while theoretically
leveling the playing field between international commercial banks, will now tip the field in favor of
nonbank financial institutions." Id. at 345.
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their U.S. counterparts, which presumably tilted the field in the Japanese banks'
favor and enabled them to capture an ever-larger share of the U.S. market.
The problem with the first explanation is that it fails to explain why the
Accord set common capital requirements but not common liquidity
requirements, given that the latter may be even more significant to systemic
stability. The problem with the second explanation is that Basel I did not level
the playing field between Japanese and U.S. banks, and-if anything-it tilted
the field even further toward the Japanese banks' advantage. Japan's high
domestic savings rate meant that the cost of equity for Japanese banks was
much lower than the cost of equity for American ones.8 1 Although Basel I
would require Japanese banks to raise more equity than American banks, the
total cost of complying with Basel I (that is, the cost of raising equity times the
amount of equity that had to be raised) would actually be higher for U.S.
institutions than for their Japanese competitors. 82
Yet, the Federal Reserve officials did press for a global bank capital
standard, despite evidence that the "level playing field" argument was
illusory. What explains the U.S. central bank's persistent promotion of global
capital standards? The majority view and the alternative hypothesis outlined in
Part I turn our attention inward-toward domestic regulatory structure. The Fed
faced severe constraints on its domestic autonomy over commercial bank
capital regulation. Consistent with the alternative hypothesis presented in Part I,
the Fed used an international institution-the Basel Committee-as a means of
gaining control over the domestic regulatory agenda.
Regulatory authority over commercial banks in the United States is
severely fractured. The Federal Reserve is the primary regulator for only one-
tenth of U.S. depository institutions. A separate agency, the FDIC, is the
primary national-level regulator for more than three-fifths of individual banks.
However, most of the largest banks come under the supervision of the Treasury
Department's Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which means that the
OCC ultimately supervises 61% of all bank assets.84 Whether we measure by
81. According to a Bank for International Settlements report, the cost of equity for Japanese
banks between 1984 and 1988 was 3.2%, compared to 12% for U.S. banks. Patricia Jackson, et al.,
Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: The Impact of the Basle Accord 41 tbl.4.2 (Basle Comm. on
Banking Supervision, Working Paper No. 1, 1999), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs wpl.pdf.
82. By one estimate, Japanese banks needed to raise $70 billion to meet the Basel
requirements, whereas U.S. banks needed to raise $30 billion. See John Evans, Japanese Banks Raised
$50 Billion in Capital over 2 Years, Official Says, AM. BANKER, Jul. 6, 1989, at 1. If these and the BIS
cost-of-equity figures are accurate, see Jackson et al., supra note 81, then the annual cost of Basel
compliance for the Japanese banking industry was $2.2 billion, compared to $3.6 billion for the U.S.
banking industry.
83. On the "decisive leadership" of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England in the Basel I
process, see Kapstein, supra note 25, at 324.
84. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., The FDIC and the Banking Industry: Perspective and
Outlook, in 2008-2013, STRATEGIC PLAN (2008), available at




the number of institutions or the percentage of assets, the vast majority of the
U.S. banking system lies beyond the Fed's immediate regulatory reach.
Table 1: Institutions and Assets Supervised by U.S. Bank Regulatory
Agencies (2008 FDIC Data)
Supervisor Number (%) of Assets (%) of
Institutions Institutions Supervised
Supervised (dollars in millions)
Federal Deposit 5134 $2,217,547
Insurance (61%) (16%)
Corporation
Comptroller of the 1556 $8,334,895
Currency (19%) (61%)
Federal Reserve 875 $1,803,611
(10%) (13%)
Office of Thrift 819 $1,217,637
Supervision (10%) (9%)
Total 8384 $13,573,691*
*Dollar amounts and percentages do not sum to total due to rounding.
Source: FDIC, supra note 84.
After the collapse of Continental Illinois National Bank in 1984-the
largest failure of a U.S. depository institution until that time85-federal
regulators from all the agencies agreed that something needed to be done to
shore up bank balance sheets. The largest U.S. banks had made massive loans
to Latin American governments, and those loans now appeared to be on the
verge of default.86 However, each regulator had a different policy preference.
of 2008). The fourth federal bank regulator, the Treasury Department's Office of Thrift Supervision,
was not founded until 1989, and thus, played no role in the negotiation of the 1988 Basel I Accord.
85. For an overview of the events leading up to the Continental Illinois collapse and the
resulting ramifications for financial markets, see Itzhak Swary, Stock Market Reaction to Regulatory
Action in the Continental Illinois Crisis, 59 J. BUS. 451 (1986).
86. James Kraus, New Maneuvers in '87 Curbed Banks' Loan Exposure, AM. BANKER, Jan.
18, 1988, at 2.
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In 1985, the regulators agreed that all banks would have to hold capital
equal to 6% of assets. But this was not a stand-alone solution because it did not
block banks from shifting away from safe investments (such as Treasury
bonds) to riskier ones (such as commercial loans and third-world government
debt). To counter this threat, the Fed, under Chairman Paul Volcker, sought to
impose a "risk bucket" approach, which would require banks to carry more
equity if they held riskier assets on their balance sheets.88 Volcker hoped that
this approach would encourage banks to adopt prudent policies.
However, Volcker faced resistance on three fronts. First, Reagan
Administration officials opposed the plan because, unlike Volcker, they wanted
to link capital requirements to the diversification of banks' balance sheets
89
(which would likely advantage the nation's largest financial institutions).
Second, the Fed's own seven-member Board of Governors was not unanimous
in its support of the plan. Governor Martha Seger said the proposal "gives me
nightmares" because it would involve federal authorities in banks' credit
allocation decisions. 90 Third, and most importantly, the Federal Reserve did not
have the approval of its fellow regulators, who effectively exercised veto power
over bank capital rules because they controlled large swaths of the banking
sector beyond the Fed's regulatory reach.
FDIC Chairman William Seidman was among the Volcker plan's most
vocal critics.91 The FDIC already had its own system to assess bank risk, the
so-called CAMEL92 rating scheme. Like the Volcker plan, CAMEL accounted
for the size of a bank's capital cushion and the riskiness of its assets, but
CAMEL also allowed FDIC supervisors to evaluate management quality,
earnings streams, and liquidity.93 FDIC officials believed that CAMEL offered
94a better measure of bank stability than risk-based capital ratios. Moreover, as
87. Nathaniel C. Nash, New Bank Rules by Fed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1985, at A37.
88. Nina Easton, Big Banks To Feel Brunt ofRisk-Based Capital Plan, AM. BANKER, Jan. 16,
1986, at 1.
89. Nina Easton, Justice Department Urges Fed To Amend Risk-Based Proposal, AM.
BANKER, May 29, 1986, at 1.
90. Barbara A. Rehm, Seger: A Different Path in Fighting Fed's Ways, AM. BANKER, Jan. 18,
1988, at 7 (quoting Seger).
91. See Bart Fraust, Seidman Opposes Volcker on Risk Plan, AM. BANKER, Nov. 21, 1985, at
1; see also Alan Wade, Can They Handle Trouble?, U.S. BANKER, Feb. 1986, at 28 (noting that
Seidman "prefers risk-based insurance to increasing bank capital").
92. The letters of CAMEL stood for the five components of each bank's rating: Capital
adequacy; Asset quality; Management; Eamings; and Liquidity. The FDIC has since incorporated a sixth
element: Sensitivity to market risk. For an overview of what is now known as the CAMELS system, see
Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Using CAMELS Ratings To Monitor Bank Conditions, FRBSF ECON.
LETTER 99-19, available at http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/wklyltr99/el99-19.html.
93. Timothy J. Curry, Peter J. Elmer & Gary S. Fissel, Using Market Information To Help
Identify Distressed Institutions: A Regulatory Perspective, FDIC BANKING REV., no. 3, 2003, at 1, 3.
94. See David Kiley, FDIC Proposing Risk-Related Premiums, NAT'L MORTG. NEWS, Sept.
30, 1985, at 5 (paraphrasing then-FDIC Chairman William M. Isaac as saying that "the FDIC's current
'CAMEL' rating system is by far the most reliable rating method available"); see also Catherine Yang,




the agency that supervised the largest number of U.S. banks, the FDIC would
bear the lion's share of the implementation costs under the Volcker plan, and
FDIC officials expressed concerns about their "potential record-keeping
burden" under Volcker's proposal. 95
Instead of risk-based capital requirements, the FDIC wanted to see risk-
based deposit insurance premiums. Previously, the FDIC had levied a 0.08%
charge on all bank deposits to finance its insurance fund. Now, the FDIC
wanted to impose higher rates on banks with worse CAMEL ratings. Unlike the
Fed's capital proposal, the FDIC's premium proposal gained broad support
from bankers.9 6 The Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee also backed
the FDIC idea.97 However, Volcker feared that the FDIC's plan would drain
funds from the weakest banks-the very banks that most needed to bolster their
capital bases. 98
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, meanwhile, took the
middle ground in the Fed-versus-FDIC debate. The OCC supported risk-based
capital requirements, but it did not share Chairman Volcker's concerns about
risk-based deposit insurance.99 Testifying to Congress in 1985, Deputy
Comptroller Michael Patriarca said that his office did "not oppose a risk-based
deposit insurance assessment," although between the two options, it took the
position that "a risk-based capital assessment is superior."'
00
The Fed had two advantages over its domestic regulatory rivals. First, Fed
officials had been meeting since 1974 with other central bankers to discuss
regulatory issues at the Bank for International Settlements headquarters in
Basel, Switzerland. Initially, the Basel Committee was a club exclusively
composed of central bankers. The Comptroller was admitted in the late
at the FDIC, as saying that if "financial ratios" supplant qualitative measures, "there will be a greater
incentive to fudge the books").
95. Barbara A. Rehm, FDIC Seen as Most Flexible Regulator in Settling Details ofRisk-Based
Capital, AM. BANKER, Apr. 22, 1988, at 19 (quoting Frutts); Mary Tobin, New Regulator Favors More
Bank Supervision, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Nov. 20, 1985.
96. The FDIC released a survey at the time showing that 80% of banks supported its risk-
based premium plan. Bart Fraust, Seidman Opposes Volcker on Risk Plan, AM. BANKER, Nov. 21, 1985,
at 1.
97. Bartlett Naylor, Volcker To Propose Risk-Based Capital Rule, AM. BANKER, Sept. 12,
1985, at 1.
98. See Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Economic Scene: Rating Banks for Insurance, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 1985, at D2 (quoting Volcker as saying that risk-based insurance premiums are "too crude to
bear th[e] burden" of deterring excessive risk-taking by banks); Bartlett Naylor, Independent Bankers
Plan To Reverse Stand and Oppose Risk-Based Premiums, AM. BANKER, Mar. 11, 1986, at 1 (noting
that "Volcker . . . opposes risk-based insurance"). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006)),
ultimately allowed the FDIC to implement a version of its risk-based deposit premium plan.
99. See Naylor, supra note 97 (noting that the "Comptroller of the Currency Robert L.
Clarke . .. supported risk-based premiums in principle").
100. Financial Condition of the Bank and Thrift Industries, Part I: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. Supervision, Regulation & Ins. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urban
Affairs, 99th Cong. 163 (1985) (statement of Michael Patriarca, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency).
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1970s,10' but central banker dominance at Basel continues. Every committee
chairman since 1974 has been a central banker. The Federal Reserve also holds
two seats on the committee, while other U.S. agencies have only one.102
Second, the Fed's proposal was the only one that was compatible with other
industrialized economies. Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom
already had risk-based requirements,' 03 but more than half of the Basel
members did not have permanent deposit insurance funds.104 Even if the other
Basel members had wanted to implement the Seidman plan, they would have
lacked the national-level infrastructure to do so.
In short, the Fed's unique position on the Basel Committee allowed
Volcker to use cross-border coordination to his domestic advantage. In early
1984, Volcker put the capital adequacy issue on the Basel Committee agenda,
although negotiations moved slowly until July 1986.105 In that month, Volcker
approached Bank of England Governor Robin Leigh-Pemberton and suggested
that the central banks bilaterally compose an Anglo-American plan.o These
talks led to an agreement between the Fed and the Bank of England in January
1987 that mirrored Volcker's earlier proposals. Central bankers in the United
States and United Kingdom then worked "to get other countries on board as
soon as possible."'0 7
In order to convince Japan to comply, the United States and United
Kingdom had to make huge concessions that undid any "level playing field"
benefits of the Accord. For example, they allowed Japanese banks to count
virtually all of their expected after-tax securities gains as capital for the
purposes of the Basel requirements.o According to a Standard & Poor's
report, this meant that Japanese banks would meet the Basel thresholds easily
101. Glenn Patrick Tobin, Global Money Rules: The Political Economy of International
Regulatory Cooperation 133 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with
author).
102. In 1983, the Fed resisted the FDIC's request for one seat on the committee (when the Fed
already had two). It yielded only after Congress demanded accommodation of the FDIC. See
International Bank Lending: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. Supervision, Regulation & Ins.
of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 390 (1983); International Lending
Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1284 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3911).
103. See DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION 42 (2008).
104. See Ash Demirgtig-Kunt & Edward J. Kane, Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where
Does It Work? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W8493, 2001), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8493.pdf.
105. See Tobin, supra note 101, at 204; John D. Wagster, Impact ofthe 1988 Basle Accord on
International Banks, 51 J. FIN. 1321, 1343-44 (1996).
106. See Ethan B. Kapstein, Between Power and Purpose: Central Bankers and the Politics of
Regulatory Convergence, 46 INT'L ORG. 265, 281 (1992).
107. Nathaniel C. Nash, Similar Standards for Banks Are Set by U.S. and Britain, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 1987, at Al.
108. Tamura Kentaro, A Regulator's Dilemma and Tivo-Level Games: Japan in the Politics of




"unless the [Tokyo] stock market drops substantially." 109 Indeed, Tokyo's
Nikkei 225 index did tumble 39% in 1990, and still, "[d]espite the sharp
decline in Japanese stock prices, none of the banks experienced problems
meeting the new capital requirement" once the Basel Accord went into
effect. 0 Whatever the factors behind the Basel I Accord, it is difficult to argue
that the Fed's driving motive was to help U.S. banks compete against their
Japanese competitors, as the Accord itself did nothing of the sort."'
The Basel Committee agreed to a draft agreement in December 1987 and
a final Accord the following July.112 Although the Accord did not level the
playing field internationally, it did tilt the balance domestically in favor of the
Fed's preferred policy. With an international consensus supporting risk-based
capital standards, the FDIC acquiesced to the new requirements. As one U.S.
negotiator recalls: "Everyone at the end of the day had to agree to it, even
though the FDIC didn't particularly believe in it." 13 By shifting negotiations
from the domestic to the international level, the Fed had limited the options for
domestic regulators. Faced 'with an either-or choice between risk-based capital
standards and the status quo, the Comptroller-and even, ultimately, the
FDIC-acquiesced to the Fed's preferred policy.
B. Beyond Basel: Two Dogs That Didn't Bark ... And One That Did
1. Liquidity Standards
The Fed's internationalist approach to bank capital requirements contrasts
with its go-it-alone approach to liquidity standards. In order to ensure that
banks have sufficient liquid assets for sudden withdrawal demands, regulators
require banks to keep a minimum amount of cash on hand. At the time of the
Basel Accord, the reserve requirement in the United States for transaction
deposits was 12%; among major industrialized nations, only West Germany
imposed higher reserve requirements than the United States (see Table 2). The
109. See James R. Kraus, Won't Stymie Banks in Japan, S&P Says, AM. BANKER, June 9,
1988, at 14.
110. Akihiro Kanaya & David Woo, The Japanese Banking Crisis of the 1990s: Sources and
Lessons 10 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 00/7, 2000), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp0007.pdf.
111. See Hal S. Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Basle Capital Accord, 39 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 885, 886-87, 891 (1995) ("A principal reason why the Basle Accord could not appreciably even
the competitive playing field between United States and foreign banks arises from what can be called the
bailout differential . . . . Given that the Japanese and European safety nets are stronger, creditors will
demand higher interest rates from United States banks than they do from European or Japanese banks
with the same leverage .... [O]ne might consider whether the Basle Accord has actually made things
worse for U.S. banks [because it is more expensive for U.S. banks to raise capital than it is for European
and Japanese banks to do so].").
112. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988).
113. Telephone Interview with Robert L. Clarke, Former Comptroller of the Currency (Dec. 1,
2008).
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United States was also one of only two Basel committee members (West
Germany being the other) that did not allow banks to earn interest on their
reserves.114 Thus, U.S. banks incurred an opportunity cost equivalent to the
interest that they would have received if they had lent funds instead of holding
them in reserve.






United Kingdom 0.45% 0.45%
United States 12.00% 3.00%
West Germany 12.10% 4.95%
If regulators pursue cross-border coordination in response to negative
externalities, then one might have expected to see the Fed push for common
liquidity requirements. As mentioned above, banks pose unique liquidity risks,
but not necessarily unique solvency risks.116 Moreover, to the extent that
regulators use cross-border coordination as a tool to "level the playing field,"
differential liquidity requirements would seem to create competitive inequities
similar to those generated by differential solvency requirements.' 17 And if
regulatory consolidation is positively correlated with cross-border coordination,
then the likelihood of a global liquidity agreement would be especially high:
the Fed's Board of Governors "has sole authority over changes in reserve
114. Tobin, supra note 101, at 177. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-343, § 128, 122 Stat. 3765, 3796 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 461), allowed banks to begin
earning interest on reserves in October 2008.
115. See Gordon H. Sellon, Jr. & Stuart E. Weiner, Monetary Policy Without Reserve
Requirements: Analytical Issues, FED. RES. BANK OF KAN. CITY ECON. REV., 4th Q. 1996, at 5, 8.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
117. See Ash Demirgfig-Kunt & Harry Huizinga, Determinants of Commercial Bank Interest
Margins and Profitability: Some International Evidence, 13 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 379, 405 (1999)
(finding a "negative relationship between reserves and profitability" in a study of banks across eighty
industrialized and developing countries); E.J. Stevens, Is There Any Rationale for Reserve
Requirements?, FED. RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND ECON. REV., 3d Q. 1991, at 2, 2 (noting that even if
other weaknesses in the U.S. banking system were resolved, "many analysts believe that reserve
requirements still would impair the international competitiveness of U.S. banks"); see also Michael D.
Bordo, Hugh Rockoff & Angela Redish, The U.S. Banking System from a Northern Exposure: Stability
Versus Efficiency, 54 J. ECON. HIST. 325, 335, 337-38 (1994) (noting that "Canadian banks generally
earned higher net returns on equity than American banks" from 1920 to 1980, and that one explanation





requirements" for U.S. depository institutions." However, the autonomy costs
for the Fed in agreeing to an international liquidity accord are high: the Fed
already enjoys free reign on this matter. Moreover, since the Fed already
controls the domestic agenda regarding reserve requirements, it has no need for
international institutional assistance in delimiting the policy menu.119 Thus,
although the "missing case" of global liquidity standards conflicts with the
externalities hypothesis and the "majority view," it remains consistent with this
Note's alternative hypothesis of a negative correlation between domestic
consolidation and cross-border coordination.
2. Holding Company Standards
The case of bank holding company ("BHC") capital adequacy poses a
similar puzzle. The Basel I Accord imposed capital requirements on
commercial banks but not on the holding companies that own them.' 20 For
example, Japan's Mitsubishi Group (which owns a carmaker, an oil company,
and a plastics manufacturer in addition to Japan's largest financial institution)
would not face group-wide regulations under Basel I; the Accord applied only
to the group's banking business. However, the Fed announced in August 1988
that it would apply Basel I's requirements to BHCs in the United States as well
as their commercial bank subsidiaries.121 Why, after a two-and-a-half-year
process of negotiating a "common international standard" for commercial
banks, would the Fed act unilaterally on BHC capital?
Since 1956, the Fed has been the primary regulator of BHCs under U.S.
law-even if the holding company's subsidiary units are supervised by other
agencies.122 As in the case of reserve ratios, this is an instance in which
regulatory authority in the United States is consolidated. Although in the
summer of 1988, as the Fed prepared to implement its BHC rules, news reports
mentioned "growing concern at the F.D.I.C. and the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency that the Fed's proposal will . . . place the nation's banking
organizations at a disadvantage against their international competitors,"l23
Fed was able to forge ahead with its plan because its regulatory authority over
BHCs was uncontested. Consistent with the alternative hypothesis-but
118. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Reserve Requirements,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm (last visited May 28, 2010).
119. The Fed briefly raised the issue of reserve requirement harmonization at the BIS in the
late 1970s, but it had dropped its harmonization efforts by the early 1980s. See Tobin, supra note 101, at
180-82.
120. See Bill Orr, The Fed Drops the Other Shoe, A.B.A. BANKING J., Oct. 1988, at 124.
121. See David Vesey, Fed Passes New Capital Requirement for Banks, UNITED PRESS INT'L,
Aug. 3, 1988.
122. See John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks to the New York Bankers
Association (Apr. 6, 2000), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2000-26a.txt.
123. See, e.g., Nathaniel C. Nash, Capital Plan Feared as a Burden on Banks, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 1988, at Dl.
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inconsistent with the majority view-the Fed adopted a go-it-alone approach to
holding company rules rather than coordinating with its cross-border
counterparts.
3. Basel II
In the mid-1990s, the Fed found itself facing constraints from rival
domestic regulators once again. In 1996, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan
remarked that "the marketplace has become much more complicated in ways
that risk-based rules cannot handle." He said he was "impressed" by the "value
at risk" ("VaR") models that large commercial banks had developed for
internal risk management purposes, and he directed Fed staff members to study
these models to determine whether they could be used as regulatory tools.124
Greenspan's ideas gained currency overseas. For example, the head of banking
supervision at the Bank of England, Michael Foot, said in 1997 that banks'
internal models could become the basis for capital requirements "in five [or] 10
years."l25 But the VaR approach did not garner support from other U.S. bank
regulators. In a December 1997 speech, Comptroller of the Currency Eugene
Ludwig acknowledged that some regulators had "misgivings about letting
financial institutions in effect set their own capital levels."l26 A May 1999
FDIC report pointed to "serious deficiencies in the proposals that regulators use
the banks' own internal risk-management models in setting capital
requirements."' 27
In 2001, the Basel Committee released a revised capital adequacy
framework that endorsed the VaR approach for internationally active banks.
The Comptroller and the FDIC, having failed to block "Basel II" at the
international level, sought to stop its implementation domestically. The Fed,
Comptroller, and FDIC all appealed to Congress for support. Fed officials
sought to leverage the expert legitimacy of the Basel Committee. For example,
Fed Vice Chairman Roger Ferguson assured a House subcommittee in February
2003 that the VaR approach "builds on the best practices in risk management in
banking over the past decade," citing the Basel Committee's explicit
124. See Alan Greenspan, What Should Regulators Do?, 78 J. LENDING & CREDIT RISK
MGMT. 14 (1996). The "value at risk" is the amount of money that banks are at risk of losing on their
loan portfolio or trading book. Theoretically, a bank should hold capital equal to or greater than that
value so that shareholders-not depositors-will bear the costs of a large loss. Id.
125. See George Graham, Bankers' Weight Loss, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1997, at 19 (quoting
Foot).
126. Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, Speech to the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council Conference on Regulatory Capital (Dec. 12, 1997), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/97-111 .txt.
127. Daniel A. Nuxoll, Internal Risk-Management Models as a Basis for Capital




endorsement.128 Moreover, the Basel II Accord changed the context of
interagency bargaining within the United States. What had been a three-way
fight among domestic regulators (or a four-way fight, if the OTS is included) 129
now looked like a quixotic attempt by the FDIC and the Comptroller to roll
back the advance of cutting-edge risk-management techniques that were being
implemented in other countries. Ultimately, under pressure from other Basel
Committee nations as well as U.S. lawmakers, the FDIC and OCC signed off
on the domestic implementation of the Basel II Accord in 2007.130 As per the
FDIC's insistence, the United States retained elements of the risk-unweighted
system that had existed alongside the Basel I rules.131 But in the end, the Fed
achieved its principal objective: switching the largest U.S. banks away from
Basel I's "risk-bucket" approach and toward a more sophisticated VaR system.
In sum, this Part has shown that over time, the Fed has used international
institutions to achieve its preferred policies in the capital adequacy issue area,
where its autonomy is limited, but it has not relied on international institutions
in areas (specifically, reserve requirements and holding company rules) in
which its mandate is wide. When the Fed faces domestic constraints, it utilizes
international institutions to legitimize its own policies and to control the
domestic agenda. Consistent with the alternative hypothesis presented in Part I,
the Federal Reserve turns to cross-border coordination on issues over which it
does not enjoy consolidated control at the domestic level.
III. Case Study: Capital Requirements in the Securities Sector
Whereas the Fed has limited autonomy to set capital requirements for U.S.
commercial banks, the SEC has had sole authority to set capital requirements
for registered broker-dealers that trade stocks and bonds on national exchanges
since the 1930s.132 However, this autonomy came under threat from two sides
in the last quarter-century. First, securities firms sought to evade SEC capital
requirements by establishing nonbroker-dealer subsidiaries that would engage
128. The New Basel Accord: In Search of a Unified U.S. Position: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 84 (2003)
(statement of Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice Chairman, Federal Reserve Board), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddoes/testimony/2003/20030619/default.htm.
129. For a summary of OTS views on Basel 11, see Basel II: Capital Changes in the U.S.
Banking System and the Results of the Impact Study: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. &
Consumer Credit & the Subcomm. on Domestic & Int'1 Monetary Policy, Trade & Tech. of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 11 (2005) (statement of Richard W. Riccobono, Acting Director,
Office of Thrift Supervision), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdfl051105rr.pdf.
130. See Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Approves Implementation of Basel I
Capital Rule (Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2007/pr0709l.html.
131. Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks at Interanational Centre for
Business Information's Riskminds 2007 Summit (Dec. 10, 2007), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2007/chairman/spdecl007.html.
132. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811(2006)).
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in off-exchange transactions (such as over-the-counter derivatives deals). This
effort was because the SEC imposed capital requirements for derivatives deals
that were so high that "no firm can afford to write such contracts within the
SEC-registered broker."' 33 Second, the Fed sought to tear down the so-called
"firewall" between bank holding companies and securities firms. The 1933
Glass-Steagall Act prohibited BHCs from affiliating with any entity that is
"engaged principally" in the underwriting or distribution of stocks and
bonds.134 The Fed chipped away at the Glass-Steagall firewall throughout the
1980s and early 1990s,'3 5 and the coup de grace came in 1999 when the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ended the sixty-six year-old prohibition on
commercial banks and securities firms combining with one another. 13 6
A decade before the repeal of Glass-Steagall, the United Kingdom's top
stock market regulator, the Securities and Investments Board ("SIB"), launched
a push for global capital adequacy standards for securities firms. (The SIB
would change its name to the Financial Services Authority in 1997, and in
2000, it gained responsibility for regulating banks and insurers as well.) The
International Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO") was the locus
of the SIB's efforts. At the time, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, Gerald Corrigan, gave his endorsement to the SIB/IOSCO
proposal, 37 and CFTC Chairwoman Wendy Gramm suggested that her agency
would support the plan as well,138 but SEC Chairman Richard Breeden rejected
the SIB/IOSCO standards, calling the capital requirement a "dangerously low"
level. In February 1993, Breeden skipped the IOSCO session in Trinidad at
which regulators had hoped to hash out a capital adequacy agreement. 140
133. See Clifford A. Ball & Hans R. Stoll, Regulatory Capital of Financial Institutions: A
Comparative Analysis, 7 FIN. MARKETS, INSTS. & INSTRUMENTS 1, 47 (1998).
134. Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 20, 48 Stat. 162, 188
(stating that "no member bank shall be affiliated in any manner ... with any corporation, association,
business trust, or other similar organization engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting,
public sale, or distribution . . . of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities").
135. A succession of Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s interpreted the Glass-Steagall Act
to allow banks and bank holding companies to engage in limited securities activities. See Clarke v. Secs.
Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987); Secs. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, 468 U.S. 207 (1984). For an
overview of legal and regulatory developments that chipped away at the Glass-Steagall firewall, see
Keith R. Fisher, Reweaving the Safety Net: Bank Diversification into Securities and Insurance Activities,
27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 (1992).
136. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C. & 16 U.S.C.).
137. See Regulators Propose Minimum Capital Rules for Securities Industry, THOMSON'S
INT'L BANKING REGULATOR, Feb. 10, 1992, at 1.
138. See Aaron Pressman, CFTC Qfficials May Oppose SEC on Capital Standards Issue,
INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Nov. 23, 1992, at 6.
139. Securities Regulation: Capital Spat, ECONOMIST, Oct. 31, 1992, at 76 (quoting Breeden).
140. IOSCO Again Fails To Reach Agreement on Minimum Capital Standards, SECURITIES




IOSCO officially ended its effort to negotiate a common capital standard that
year.141
Meanwhile, on the domestic front, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act further
fragmented the regulatory structure for U.S. securities firms. Specifically, it
allowed securities firms to transform themselves into BHCs, which would let
them borrow directly from the Fed and achieve a more secure source of
liquidity.142 If a securities firm selected the BHC option, then the Fed-not the
SEC-would become its consolidated supervisor. In a further threat to the
SEC's primacy over the securities sector, the Office of Thrift Supervision
interpreted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act as allowing it to exercise supervisory
authority over three major securities firms, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch,
and Morgan Stanley, which owned small savings-and-loan associations.143
Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, securities firms also had the option to
choose the SEC as their consolidated supervisor (in which case the
Commission would oversee the entire company, not just its broker-dealer unit)
or the option to stick with the status quo, in which the SEC only oversaw
broker-dealer operations. 1" Initially, all the major investment banks selected
this latter option.
Further complicating matters, the European Union passed a Financial
Conglomerates Directive in 2002 that required non-EU firms to find a national
regulator within the European Union that would verify that the firm's home-
country regulator provided "consolidated supervision" that was "equivalent" to
EU requirements. If the firm and its U.S. regulator failed to gain equivalence
recognition, the firm would have to comply with EU requirements directly,
141. DAVID ANDREw SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 93 (2007).
142. The securities firms Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs exercised this option in
September 2008. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Vikas Bajaj, Shit for Goldman and Morgan Marks the End of
an Era, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, at Al.
143. See Letter from James E. Gilleran, Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, to Jonathan G.
Katz, Sec'y, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Feb. 11, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72103/ots021l04.htm ("The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ... kept the
responsibility for supervision of the holding company itself with the OTS or the Federal Reserve Board,
depending upon whether the holding company was a SLHC [savings and loan holding company] or a
bank holding company."); cf Consolidated Supervision of U.S. Securities Firms and Affiliated Industrial
Loan Corporations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. (2007) (statement of
Robert Colby, Deputy Director, Division of Market Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2007/ts042507rc.htm ("Lehman Brothers, Merrill
Lynch and Morgan Stanley also own thrifts that account for 3.3%, 1.7% and 0% of the consolidated
assets of each firm respectively.").
144. The post-Gramm-Leach-Bliley structure for holding company supervision is summarized
at GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION: AGENCIES ENGAGED IN
CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION CAN STRENGTHEN PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND COLLABORATION
12-14 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-154. The SEC discontinued its
consolidated supervision program in September 2008.
243
Yale Journal on Regulation
starting in 2005.145 The Fed already exercised consolidated supervisory
authority over BHCs, and Fed Governor Susan Bies testified to a House
committee in May 2004 that the Fed "fully expect[s] that U.S. banking
organizations will be found to meet the supervision standard of the
directive."1 4 6 But other agencies scrambled to obtain "equivalence" recognition
from their European counterparts. The SEC opened talks with the United
Kingdom's FSA, as London was the site of the European head offices for the
largest U.S. securities firms. The OTS approached the FSAl47 as well as
France's Commission Bancaire (which would ultimately recognize the OTS as
an "equivalent" supervisor for the ill-fated insurance giant AIG).148
Competitive pressure from the Fed and the OTS meant that if the SEC did
not coordinate with its EU counterparts, another U.S. agency might gain EU
authorization to serve as the "equivalent" supervisor for the largest U.S.
investment banks. Accordingly, the SEC moved to establish a new
"Consolidated Supervised Entity" ("CSE") program that would set capital
requirements on a holding-company-wide basis for firms that opted into the
arrangement. Five firms-Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers,
Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley-did so. The United Kingdom's FSA
recognized the CSE arrangement as "equivalent" to its own supervision-thus
allowing the five firms to operate in the European Union after the Financial
Conglomerates Directive took effect in 2005. As an added (and possibly
"unnecessary") 149 inducement to lure the firms into the CSE program, the SEC
allowed firms in the program to calculate their capital requirements on a VaR
basis (consistent with Basel II) instead of abiding by longstanding broker-
dealer capital rules.150
145. Directive 2002/87, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002
on the Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions, Insurance Undertakings and Investment Firms
in a Financial Conglomerate, 2002 0.J (EC).
146. U.S.-EU Regulatory Dialogue: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 108th Cong.
(2004) (statement of Susan Bies, Governor, Federal Reserve Board), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2004/20040513/default.htm.
147. The Financial Services Authority determined that the OTS "provides equivalent
consolidated supervision" for several U.S. financial institutions, including Ameriprise Financial Group
and GE Capital Services. See Press Release, Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS Named EU Coordinating
Supervisor of Ameriprise Financial Group Unit Threadneedle Group (Sept. 8, 2006), available at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/%5C?p=PressReleases&ContentRecord id=8738bd85-00fd-42de-a3a9-
0918b4aac6el; Press Release, Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS Named EU Coordinating Supervisor of
GE (Dec. 22, 2004), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/77454.html.
148. Press Release, Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS Receives EU Equivalency Designation
for Supervision of AIG (Feb. 22, 2007), available at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/%5C?p=PressReleases&ContentRecord-id=df05bfa2-8364-45a7-bf4c-
18437165clIf.
149. John C. Coffee, Analyzing the Credit Crisis: Was the SEC Missing in Action?, N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 5, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202426495544.
150. For an overview of the CSE program, see SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N: OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., SEC's OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED





Because of this last provision, the CSE program acquired a measure of
infamy after the five firms either went bankrupt or required government
bailouts in 2008.151 In September 2008, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox
announced that it had discontinued the program (at which point all five firms
had either ceased to exist as independent entities or already applied to the Fed
for BHC status). Cox acknowledged that the CSE program "was fundamentally
flawed from the beginning because investment banks could opt in or out of
supervision voluntarily."1 5 2
This criticism may be unfair. The CSE program marked the first time that
the SEC gained standard-setting authority over broker-dealers' holding
companies-a power that the SEC had sought for years. 153 Absent the CSE
program, the SEC would have had authority to set capital levels only for
investment banks' broker-dealer units, and the SEC would have had limited
ability to address risks emerging elsewhere in the firms' portfolios. Moreover,
the SEC's CSE program should be evaluated against the alternatives-which
included OTS supervision for securities firms. Then-OTS Director James
Gilleran famously appeared at a 2003 press conference with a chainsaw to
show that he would cut regulatory requirements for financial institutions. 154 To
fund its operations, the OTS "depend[ed] on fees paid by banks it regulate[d]
and compete[d] with other regulators to land the largest financial firms." 155 The
OTS's own consolidated supervision program did not have any specific
quantitative capital requirements for holding companies. In this respect, the
CSE program can be seen as having prevented the OTS from gaining regulatory
responsibility over several large investment banks-a fate that might have
made the financial crisis even worse.
The relevant question for this Note, however, is not whether the SEC
should have acted differently in establishing the CSE program in 2004, but why
it acted as it did. More specifically, why did it stymie cross-border coordination
at the beginning of the 1990s and spearhead such efforts in the early 2000s?
151. Stephen Labaton, Agency's '04 Rule: Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
2008, at Al.
152. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated
Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
230.htm.
153. See Consolidated Supervision of U.S. Securities Firms and Affiliated Industrial Loan
Companies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, I 10th Cong. (2007)
(statement of Erik Sirri, Director, Division of Market Regulation, Securities and Exchange
Commission), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2007/tsl00407ers.htm (stating that
"[o]ver the past twenty years," the SEC has become "increasingly concerned about the risk that a
broker-dealer may fail due to the insolvency of its holding company or an affiliate" and noting that the
Commission "undertook a number of initiatives to conduct group-wide risk assessments of financial
institutions with significant broker-dealer subsidiaries" after 1990).
154. See Greg Ip & Damian Paletta, Regulators Scrutinized in Mortgage Meltdown, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 23, 2007, at A14.
155. See Binyamin Applebaum & Ellen Nakashima, Banking Regulator Played Advocate over
Enforcer, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2008, at Al. The SEC, by contrast, relies on congressional
appropriations for its funding. See GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 144, at 14.
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The "externalities" argument offers little insight. The securities industry
was already quite globalized in the early 1990s, so fears about systemic risk
and a "level playing field" do little to explain the SEC's shift. Moreover, the
"externalities" argument assumes that all regulators respond to negative
externalities similarly. Why did the Fed and the CFTC-but not the SEC-
support the SIB/IOSCO plan in the early 1990s?
The concept of "autonomy costs" offers a possible answer. The Fed and
CFTC had little to lose by binding themselves to global capital adequacy
standards for securities firms because they did not have authority over
securities firms at the domestic level. In the early 1990s, autonomy costs for the
SEC were much higher because the SEC would be ceding control over an issue
area that lay within its discretion.
Moreover, the SEC's switch from anti-coordination to pro-coordination
contradicts the majority view regarding regulatory consolidation. The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act further fragmented regulatory authority by enabling the Fed
and OTS to wield supervisory powers over securities firms. And yet, it was
only after Gramm-Leach-Bliley that the SEC sprung into action.
The SEC's successful efforts to negotiate an agreement with its U.K.
counterpart in the early 2000s seem to illustrate the "race to coordinate"
phenomenon. The SEC faced competitive pressure from the Fed and OTS; if
the United Kingdom's FSA or another EU regulator did not recognize the SEC
as an "equivalent" supervisor, presumably the large U.S. investment banks, in
order to maintain their access to European markets, would have rechartered
under the supervision of a U.S. regulator that had gained EU equivalence
recognition. Whether or not the SEC's Consolidated Supervised Entity program
was a wise one, the story of its establishment is consistent with the alternative
hypothesis presented in Part 1.156
IV. Case Study: The Mystery of the Missing Global Insurance Standard
The "mystery" of the missing global capital requirements for insurers and
reinsurers might not seem so mysterious at first glance. Insurers, as mentioned
above,157 are less vulnerable to runs than are institutions that rely on demand
deposits and short-term debt. Moreover, insurers are "generally less
156. One might argue that the EU Financial Conglomerates Directive-not the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act's further fragmentation of domestic regulatory authority-was the impetus for the U.S.-U.K.
agreement on the consolidated supervision of securities firms. Since the domestic regulatory landscape
and the EU rules regarding foreign firms changed at roughly the same time, it is impossible to separate
the impact of one factor from the other. What we can say with relative certainty is that if the SEC's
move towards cross-border coordination was motivated by the further fragmentation of domestic
regulatory authority, then the SEC's actions were consistent with a pattern of behavior that was also
evinced by the Federal Reserve with respect to bank regulation, see supra Part H, and by the Treasury
Department with respect to insurance regulation, see infra Part IV.




interconnected" than banks'58 (although the collapse of AIG arguably
contradicts this conclusion).159 This rationale does not necessarily apply to
reinsurers, however. Reinsurers take on the liabilities of primary insurance
companies (in exchange for a premium), and they are also major counterparties
to banks and securities firms in derivatives transactions. As a 2002
International Monetary Fund report noted, the simultaneous failure of several
reinsurers would suddenly "leave many primary insurers with unhedged . . .
exposures," which might lead the primary insurers to "withdraw[] from capital
markets and attempt[] to unwind OTC derivatives hedges and liquidate part of
their portfolios in order to return their financial and insurance risk profiles to
more desirable positions."'6o Moreover, the reinsurance industry is intensely
competitive, and U.S. reinsurers have seen the erosion of their domestic market
share in recent years. In 1996, foreign reinsurers had captured 39% of the U.S.
market;16' by 2008, that figure had risen to 84%.162
Upon first glance, the reinsurance case might seem to support the
"majority view" that regulatory fragmentation is an obstacle to cross-border
coordination. Insurance and reinsurance regulation in the United States is
highly balkanized. 16 3 With the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, Congress
164granted insurance regulatory authority to state-level supervisors. 1 However,
"[ilssues of centralization aside, state regulators are quite powerful within their
jurisdictions."l65 In many states, they even have the power to set prices for
financial products-a ,ower that is unique among financial service regulators
in the United States. Moreover, state insurance agencies typically have a
single commissioner, whereas federal agencies generally have multiple-
158. Dirk Heremans, Financial Regulation and Stability of the Banking System, in
EXPLORATIONS IN FINANCIAL ETHics 31, 46 (Luc Van Liederkerke, Jef Van Gerwen & Danny
Cassimon eds., 2000).
159. But see Harrington, supra note 30, at 2 ("Apart from AIG, the insurance sector as a whole
was largely on the periphery of the crisis. The AIG crisis was heavily influenced by its CDS portfolio,
sold by a non-insurance entity, AIG Financial Products (AIGFP), which was not subject to insurance
regulation.").
160. Int'l Monetary Fund, The Financial Market Activities of Insurance and Reinsurance
Companies, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 21, 46 (2002), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/gfsr/2002/02/pdf/chp3.pdf
161. See Debra J. Hall, US Reinsurance Regulation: A Reinsurance Market Perspective 5 tbl.3
(2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.regulatoryandriskconsultants.com/uploadsfUSReinsuranceRegulation.pdf.
162. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
163. See SINGER, supra note 141, at 104.
164. See Martin F. Grace & Michael M. Barth, The Regulation and Structure of Nonlife
Insurance in the United States 10 (World Bank Fin. Sector Dev. Policy Research, Working Paper No.
1155, 1993).
165. See SINGER, supra note 141, at 104.
166. See Martin F. Grace & Richard D. Phillips, Regulator Performance, Regulatory
Environment and Outcomes: An Examination of Insurance Regulator Career Incentives on State
Insurance Markets, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 116, 117, 129-30 (2008).
247
Yale Journal on Regulation
commissioners.167 Thus, state insurance supervisors enjoy greater individual
autonomy to set rules than federal financial regulators.
In recent years, the Treasury Department has sought to expand its
authority over the insurance and reinsurance industries. Then-Secretary
Paulson's 2008 blueprint called for the creation of a "federal insurance
charter"; if an insurer opted for the federal charter, then the Treasury
Department-not a state commissioner-would be the firm's primary
regulator.'66 Although the 2009 Treasury White Paper does not incorporate this
proposal, it would establish an office within the Treasury Department that
would be authorized to "negotiate international agreements . . . and coordinate
policy in the insurance sector."l 69 Senator Dodd of Connecticut incorporated a
strengthened version of the White Paper proposal into his financial reform bill.
The Dodd proposal would allow the Treasury Department to preempt state
insurance regulations that conflict with international insurance accords.' 70 State
insurance commissioners vigorously lobbied lawmakers to defeat the Dodd
proposal,171 but the final version of the legislation allows the Director of the
Federal Insurance Office, a new sub-agency within Treasury, to render a state
insurance measure null and void if it is inconsistent with an international
agreement that the Treasury Department and the U.S. Trade Representative
have negotiated.172
It is too early to tell whether the Treasury Department will succeed in its
efforts to coordinate insurance and reinsurance regulations with cross-border
counterparts. What is clear at this early stage is that the bureaucratic advocates
for cross-border coordination in insurance supervision (including officials in
the Bush and Obama Treasury Departments) are also the regulators who face
the lowest domestic autonomy costs (since Treasury had almost no authority
over the insurance sector before the Dodd-Frank Act). Meanwhile, the fiercest
opponents of the expanded Treasury Department powers are state officials,173
for whom cross-border coordination would impose high autonomy costs
because the state commissioners already enjoy wide discretion over insurance
regulation. In short, the case study of insurance/reinsurance capital standards
167. Id.
168. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 16.
169. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 5, at 13.
170. See Efforts To Change Insurance Provisions in Dodd Bill Face Uphill Battle, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, May 14, 2010, at 9.
171. See Silla Brush, Merkley Backing a Push To Give States Strong Powers To Regulate
Insurance, THE HILL (May 3, 2010, 7:27 PM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/95767-merkley-
wants-states-to-regulate-insurance.
172. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 313(f)(1)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1583 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5412) (granting the
Treasury Department authority to preempt state measures that are "inconsistent with a covered
agreement"); id. § 313(r)(2) (defining "covered agreement").
173. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Regulators and Reform: NAIC Shares
Recommendations with Congress (May 19, 2010), available at




confirms the intuition-articulated in Part I-that the willingness of regulators
to engage in cross-border coordination is inversely related to their domestic
policymaking autonomy.
Conclusion
This Note has cast doubt on the conventional wisdom that regulatory
consolidation at the domestic level facilitates regulatory coordination at the
international level. Part I explained why the opposite might be the case: when a
regulator has consolidated control over a given issue area, then the autonomy
costs of cross-border coordination are especially high. By contrast, agencies in
a fragmented regulatory environment may use international agreements as
agenda-control devices and may leverage the legitimacy of multilateral
institutions in domestic debates. Finally, domestic fragmentation may create
competitive pressures, as rival regulators vie to win the "race to coordinate."
Part II showed that the Federal Reserve has adopted a go-it-alone approach
when the autonomy costs of cross-border coordination are high (for example,
on liquidity regulation and holding company rules), but has been a driving
force behind the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which sets capital
requirements for commercial banks (an issue area over which the Fed's
domestic control is severely constrained). Part III showed that the SEC changed
its approach to global capital requirements for securities firms after the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act planted the possibility that investment banks could
choose the Fed or the OTS as their consolidated supervisor. This episode
illustrated the role of regulatory fragmentation in stimulating competitive
pressures that, in turn, increase the probability of cross-border coordination.
Finally, Part IV analyzed the case of capital regulation in the insurance and
reinsurance industries. Although it is too early to tell whether the Treasury
Department will succeed in negotiating international insurance agreements, the
story so far suggests that the advocates for more extensive cross-border
coordination are the regulators who will face low autonomy costs, whereas the
regulators who resisted the Dodd proposal are the state insurance
commissioners for whom the corresponding autonomy costs are high.
These findings strongly suggest that Part I's alternative hypothesis
correctly characterizes the relationship between regulatory consolidation and
cross-border coordination. Thus, contrary to the conventional wisdom, more
consolidation will likely lead to less cross-border coordination.174 Does this
174. Although this Note has only addressed the intersection of international financial
governance and the U.S. domestic regulatory landscape, there is some evidence that Japanese regulators
have also used international agreements as a mechanism to gain leverage vis-A-vis domestic rivals. See,
e.g., Colombatto & Macey, supra note 61, at 944 (stating that in the Basel I process, "Japanese
bureaucrats were able to collude with bureaucrats from other countries in order to obtain more
discretionary regulatory authority"); Kentaro, supra note 108, at 222 (noting that during the Basel I
process, the Japanese Ministry of Finance "used foreign pressure to pursue its domestic goal of
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mean that scholars and policymakers who support regulatory consolidation on
the grounds that it will facilitate international cooperation should actually be
advocating for further fragmentation instead?
This conclusion does not necessarily follow. From a policy perspective,
what matters is not the occurrence of cross-border coordination but the content
of that coordination. International regulatory coordination is not an unmitigated
good. The Basel I Accord, for example, "contributed to the growth in
securitization by assigning lower capital charges and thus giving incentives to
institutions to move their assets into off-balance-sheet securitization
vehicles."175 Since it was these vehicles that ultimately proved to be the
undoing of Lehman Brothers' 76 (and nearly Citigroup as well),177 the case can
be made that the Basel Accords actually contributed to the current crisis.'78
Moreover, a "race to compete" might lead agencies to accept ill-considered
cross-border regulatory arrangements simply to preempt another domestic
agency (as arguably occurred in the case of the SEC's Consolidated Supervised
Entity program with the United Kingdom's FSA). Although the historical
record strongly suggests that regulatory fragmentation will generate more
international agreements, it will not necessarily generate better international
agreements.
Ultimately, the desirability of regulatory consolidation depends on a
complicated calculus of costs and benefits. Fragmentation may allow firms to
engage in regulatory arbitrage, choosing the supervisor whose standards are
most lax. At the same time, consolidation creates the risk of "capture of the
legislation for capital adequacy rules"); see also H. Richard Friman, International Pressure and
Domestic Bargains: Regulating Money Laundering in Japan, 21 CRIME, LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE 253
(1994) (suggesting that the Japanese Ministry of Finance used cross-border coordination as a means of
overcoming Postal Ministry resistance to stringent money laundering regulations).
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every $100 in unsecuritized mortgage loans and $10 in capital for every $100 in corporate loans. See
Jeffrey Friedman & Wladimir Kraus, A Silver Lining to the Financial Crisis: A More Realistic View of
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177. See Tracy Alloway, Citi's Super-Safe CDOs? Puh-lease, FT.COM, Apr. 8, 2010,
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178. See Demirg0i-Kunt & Servdn, supra note 175, at 103 ("While advocates claimed that
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evident in this approach."); Friedman & Kraus, supra note 175, at 1 ("Powerful evidence suggests that
the recourse rule, and other variants of Basel regulations on commercial banks' capital, caused the
crisis.").
179. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in




regulatory mothership." 80 Whereas oversight lapses at the OTS only affected a
small fraction of U.S. banks18' (and one very large insurer' 82), a top-down
failure at a consolidated regulator could have truly catastrophic consequences.
Perhaps even more important than the question of whether to have a
consolidated regulator is the question of who the consolidated regulator should
be. The Federal Reserve brings the advantages of institutional independence
and vastly superior resources (as its budget is not dependent on congressional
appropriations); 183 however, the Fed (and particularly its New York branch)
also has a historically cozy relationship with the money center banks. 184 FDIC
Chairwoman Sheila Bair has won admirerss as a result of her crusading
approach to regulation; 18 however, the FDIC has less experience than the Fed
and the OCC in overseeing complex multinational financial institutions such as
the large investment banks. 87
This Note does not seek to resolve the debate over regulatory
consolidation. In deciding whether to consolidate regulatory responsibilities in
a particular agency, we must weigh the pros and cons carefully, and the balance
may be close. Several commentators have suggested that balance should tip in
favor of regulatory consolidation because consolidation will facilitate cross-
border coordination8 As the preceding Parts have shown, this "benefit" of
consolidation is illusory. It would be a shame if the debate over consolidation
were decided based on a misguided belief in a nonexistent "benefit."
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